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It may be in the interest of low-ability individuals to subsidize the
education of high-ability individuals. Sufficient conditions are
surprisingly mild: positive externalities in education and
complementarity in production between human capital and labor
supllied by the low-ability individuals. However, tax competition and the
free mobility of the educated give rise to time-inconsistency and free-
riding problems which render such a social contract infeasible and
result in a subotimally low investment in education.
Keywords: Externalities in education, complementarity, social contract,
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vVhy is the burden of financing higher education typically shared willingly
by non-altruistic low-ability agents who themselves abstain from investment
in human capital? VVhywould anybody be ready to invest in the education
of his or her neighbor?l Why do low-ability agents typically pay high taxes,
thereby participating in financing the education of their fellowcitizens? Such
a political equilibrium appears surprising in a democratic society where the
low-ability agents typically represent a majority.
The current paper suggests an answer to this question based on two key
mechanisms: externalities in education and complementarities in production.
Large universities, isolated university campuses, and research institutes with
a high concentration of trained human brains bear testimony to the exis-
tence of positive externalities in the production of human capital. In the
light of such evidence, one can expect that the resulting equilibrium tends to
be characterized by underinvestment in human capital in systems with de-
centralized decision-making. It appears therefore to be collectively rational
for high-ability agents to coordinate their investment so as to maximize their
joint income. A social contract could thus be introduced to internalize the
external effects in the education process. Tax policy could be thought of as
a mechanism to implement such a contract. However, it can also be argued
that such a coordination need not be efficient from a broader perspective
because it obviously neglects the impact of the created human capital on
the marginal productivity of other productive inputs. Social gains are not
limited to the mutual trade between those to be educated. VVhilethe ex-
ternal effects justify within-group mutual subsidies, between-group subsidies
might offer additional mutual benefits. It is plausible that the investment
in human capital made by high-ability agents generates productivity gains
for low-ability agents as weil. Such gains appear feasible within modern
technologies with complementarities in production.2
We show that in the presence of externalities and complementarities in
production it may actually be in the best interest oflow-ability individuals to
1More generally, are there effieieney arguments whieh may explain voluntary eross-
subsidization between sodal classes?
2Recent empirical studies point to strang eomplementarity between workers with low
levels of human eapital and high levels of human eapital, cf. Cieeone, Peri and Almond
(1999) using US Census data for 1970, 1980, and 1990. For earlier studies, see Goldin and
Katz (1998).
2subsidize the educational investment of high-ability individuals so as to enjoy
the productivity gains. The distribution of the gains created by such a social
contract depends on the relative social power of different groups. We take it
as given that the bargaining solution cannot reduce the net income of either
group compared to the market solution, where education is financed privately
and where there are no cross subsidies. We suggest how an efficient tax
structure with respect to earnings by high-ability and low-ability individuals
can be derived given their relative social power.
The possibility to arrive at a social contract will radically deteriorate
when educated labor becomes mobile and tax policy is not harmonized in a
network of jurisdictions. In the absence of binding commitments regarding
residence or post-education tax liability independent of residence, educated
labor has an incentive ex post to migrate to ajurisdiction with lowertax rates
so as to evade its share of the investment cost. Moreover, low-ability agents
have an option of free riding on human capital created in other jurisdictions.
We show that anational social contract cannot survive for these two reasons
in the presence of free mobility without tax coordination.3 Such a problem
can be viewed as a social cost of coordination failure. The resulting regional
underinvestment in human capital suggests a need to harmonize educational
policy (or tax policy) internationally.We note that Rehme (1999) has recently
introduced a complementary analysis where low-skilled individuals partici-
pate in financing education. In his model, education is financed by a uniform
tax on capital. He analyzes the interaction between investment in education
and economic growth under alternative public policy objectives. Individuals
are ex ante identical, the number of those to be educated being adecision
variable of the government.
Our paper is organized as folIows. Section 2 introduces a model of a
"dass" society. People are assumed to be heterogeneous ex ante. Both
dasses may be subject to training or education. However, we assume that
the low-ability types are subject to a standard and given education which
will not be modeled explicitly. The "talented", high-ability people qualify
for further education to acquire special skills. When labor inputs supplied
by different ability types are complementary, unskilled labor will also benefit
'We notice that more recently there has been some tendency to move from fully tax-
financed education towards tuition fees in same \Vestern economies. Such a change ob-
viously has to do with the fact that the mobility of the educated has increased between
jurisdictions. For example, Eklund (1998) reports that in 1996 15 % of graduates left
Sweden, while ten years earJier the corresponding figure was only one third of that.
3from educational investment by high-ability individuals. Section 3 analyzes
a Pareto-efficient solution, where surplus created by increased investment in
education is shared by both high- and low-ability individuals. We derive a
Nash-bargaining solution and show that if the relative weights of the two
groups correspond to their income shares arising from constant elasticity
technology of the Cobb-Douglas type, both groups face positive tax rates
in the efficient solution. In section 4 we show that in the absence of policy
coordination, such an outcome cannot survive in a federation if migration is
costless. Section 5 concludes.
2 Decentralized Investment in Knowhow
Assume that a population of size 1 + n is heterogeneous and consists of
"low-ability" agents whose size is normalized to be one, and of n > 0 "high-
ability"agents. Before the value-added is produced, the knowhow embodied
in skilIed labor is created by investment in the education of the high-ability
agents. Investment is subject to decreasing returns; however, there will be
positive externalities between those to be educated. We denote the resource
cost of educational investment by e and the resulting human capital by h. Its
production is subject to externalities in the sense that students learn from
each other. Then each educated agent is assumed to be equipped with human
capital
h = eßer (1)
where e is the average educational investment by high-ability agents and
h stands for the resulting human capital of each agent. We assume 0 <
ß,1,ß + 1< 1. Total total human capital of the economy is then given by
H = nh. This knowhow is used as a complementary input to unskilled labor
to produce the value-added, say Y. A production technology of the Cobb-




(2)where 1 stands for the complementary input of unskilled labor and a repre-
sents the income share of skilled labor of the total value-added.
Our model can be interpreted as a two-period model, in which education
takes place in the first and labor supply in the second period. There is no
uncertainty and no discounting.4 \Ve assurne therefore that there are no
constraints to lending or borrowing at a constant interest rate assumed to
be zero. Furthermore, we assurne that labor supply is inelastic, and that
there are no leisure costs of education in addition to the resource cost e. lt
follows from our assumptions that we do not need to introduce any explicit
utility function. lndividuals do optimize their consumption decisions, but all
we have to analyze is how they maximize their totallifetime income, net of
investment costs.
We first consider equilibrium in the absence of factor mobility and under
fully decentralized investment decisions. The maximization problem of the
high-ability agents can be stated as
m:xy = -e + eßeraH"'-l. (3)
The second-term on the right-hand side of (3) is the private return on
educational investment e. It is the marginal private return on human cap-
ital aH"'-l obtained from (2), multiplied by human capital per agent eßer.
Agents behave atomistically, neglecting the impact of their investment on
aggregate knowhow, Le. they consider H = nh as constant in the maximiza-
tion of (3). The individual's first-order condition determining the optimal e
is given by
ßeß-1eraH",-1 = 1, (4)
4 Allowing for risks in educational investment and risk aversion would lead to the issue
of an optimal sodal insurance contract. It is apparent that an insurance contract among
the educated would turn out to be welfare-improving; whether the non-educated would
find it rational to raise, compared to the solution without uncertainty, the share of their
income they are ready to contribute to the educational investment of the high-ability types
will not be addressed here.
5where the left-hand side represents the marginal return to educational in-
vestment. It is now convenient to introduce




as the equilibrium intramarginal return on education for high-ability agents,
net of the investment cost.
The validity of this definition can be seen as folIows. Solving eß-1 from (4)
and inserting its expression into the rate ofreturn on investment, (eßer o:Ha-l-
e)/ e, Le. the net return to education relative to the investment cost, one ar-
rives at (5).
Inserting the symmetry condition e = eand introducing h from (1) into
(4), one arrives at the privately optimal investment
e= (o:ßna-I)I', (6)
where J1. = I-a(~+~)' Clearly, 1 - o:(ß +,) > O. Thus, private incentives to
acquire education are adversely affected by the share of high-ability agents
in the population (n). Such a mechanism is natural; high n means that
high-ability agents do not represent a scarce resource.
Under decentralized investment, the reward to the educated agents, net of
the private cost ofeducation, and the reward to the fixed factor, respectively,
are given by
171= -ne + o:Ha = neA
172 = (1- o:)W.
(7)
(8)
Notice that A = 0 when ß = 1, Le. with constant private returns to
educational investments there will be no intramarginal rents; hence, the rent
on education \vill vanish. Note also that we analyze here only the rent from
6educational investment. The result should not be interpreted to imply that all
the income of the educated would have to be tied to educational investment.
To be exact, the income of the educated should equal investment cost plus
opportunity cost, that is, the income a high-ability individual would earn if
he or she remained uneducated. We abstract from the opportunity cost. We
could, of course, include the opportunity cost in education technology, but
that would only complicate the analysis.
The earnings by the high-ability and low-ability agents can be presented
after substituting H = nh, (1) and (6) to (7) and (8) to read as
Y1= n(aßn"-I)I').
Y2 = (l-a)[n(aßn,,-I)<ß+-t!I']".
We next report the key result:
(9)
(10)
Proposition 1 Unskilled labor will benefit fmm the educational investment
of the high-ability agents and the more so, the more pmductive such invest-
ments are and the bigger the ertemalities between the educated are. More-
over, the income of unskilled labor is positively dependent upon the size of
the population of educated people in the economy.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the foregoing, Le. from the role
played by ß, -y and n in the equations above. -
This finding is rather striking. It raises the exciting question whether the
unskilled agents have incentives to contribute to the education investment
of the high-ability types. In other words, are Pareto improvements available
through a voluntary social contract? We formulate below such a mechanism
in tenns of a Nash-bargaining procedure regarding the equilibrium of the
current section as the social "status quo". It turns out that the answer is
definitively positive - but only if -y > 0, i.e. the private investments are
inefficient.
73 Sodal Contract between High-Ability and
Low-Ability Agents
Consider sodal bargaining on a sodal contract where both types of agents
agree to contribute to the production of knowhow a fraction of their income,
say tl and t2.5 Such a voluntary contract may arise as a result of a political
process, in which case it would be natural to regard them as tax (or subsidy)
rates. Assume that the bargaining power of the two groups is given by
Band 1 - B, respectively, and consider the outcome of the following Nash
bargaining
max U = (Y; - 1'd9(Y2 - 1'2)1-9.
e,tl.t2 (11)
We have denoted the fall-back values by Yi and Y2 and net incomes as
Y; = (1 - tdaW'
Y2 = (1- t2)(1 - a)W',
where tl and t2 denote the shares of income contributed to finandng educa-
tion. Because we are working with the case of an inelastic labor supply, it
is possible to separate the maximization of the surplus from its division be-
tween the factors. Indeed, it is in the interest of both groups that the surplus
is maximized regardless of its division.6 As an externality is involved, the
market solution cannot lead to the maximization ofsurplus. The educational
investment which maximizes the surplus
5There is no identification problem in the sense of low-ability types trying to acquire
public1y finaneed edueation. Such an ineentive ean be eliminated either by the govern-
ment's ability to sereen students or by the suffieiently large non-monetary eosts faced by
low-ability individuals when mimieking the high-ability types.
6We would like to point out that the solution of (11) does not neeessarily eoineide
with that of an optimal tax model. First, even if there is a fixed input in the model
pointing to the possibility that the associated optimal tax rate would be high perhaps
even approaehing unity, there are heterogeneous agents in our model, whereby ineome
effeets also beeome relevant. Seeond, a standard welfare eriterion, say of a utilitarian
or Rawlsian variety, would apparently lead to a different solution, unless the benevolent
government \vould adjust its criterion to repHcate the process of Nash bargaining.
8is given by
m~(YI + Y;) = -ne + H" = -ne + n"e,,(ß+-y)
e' = [o,(ß + "Y)n"-I]".
(12)
(13)
Comparing (13) and (6), the socially optimal education e' exceeds the
market solution, e' > e. The shares of financing the educational investment
are found as folIows. It has to hold that the total expenditure on educa-
tion, ne, is financed by the contributions of the two classes, satisfying the
educational budget constraint




(1 - o,)H" .
Inserting this expression into the maximization problem (11), we obtain
" - 9 ne - tlo,H" ,,- 1-9
maxU=[(I-tl)o,H -Yd [(1- ( \T-T )(I-o,)H -Y2] • tl 1-0, "
Taking logarithlllS and denoting u = In U , we obtain
(14)
max u = BIn[(1 - tdo,H" - gj + (1 - B)In[(1 - o,)H" - ne + tlo,H" - gl. t,
(15)
In an appendix we show that the tax rates resulting from Nash bargaining
are given by





It is the intrinsic nature ofthese solutions that they depend upon the fall-
back values given by (9) and (10). The key issue we address is under what
conditions low-ability types willingly end up subsidizing high-ability types.
Such an outcome is equivalent to having t2 > 0, which then is equivalent to
t1 < ß+" from (17). When, = 0, we can see that t1 = ß and t2 = O.
This is expected, because the market solution is an efficient solution in the
absence of the externality, and the high-ability types finance their educa-
tion thernselves. Moreover, assuming extreme vaIues of the parameters, one
cannot exclude the case that the contribution of any of the two groups may
be negative.7 However, they are definitely both positive in more interesting
cases. Assurne, für example, that bargaining power is linked to economic
power. More specifically, let us work out the case where ()= a, that is, the
relative weight of the high-ability individuals is determined by their income
share arising from their role in production. Then one can show that the con-
tribution of the high-ability agents resulting from Nash bargaining is given
by
t1 = ßa(1 - (L)a(ß+~)i')+,a + ß(_ß_)a(ß+~)i'. (18) ß+, ß+,
The corresponding contribution of the low-ability agents who remain un-




7Für example, if Cl = 0.1, ß = 0.2, 'Y= 0.5, and B = 0.9, meaning that human capital
depends more on the average investment in education than on the own investment of an
individual, we obtain tl = -0.07. On the other hand, if Cl = 0.9, ß = 0.5, "f = 0.2 and
B = 0.1, we obtain t2 = -0.1.
10Proposition 2 When the relative power of the high-ability agents is deter-
mined by their income share arising from their role in production, the social
contmct on financing education, obtained through Nash-bargaining, results in
voluntary positive contributions of both the high-ability and the low-ability
agents.
Proof. The claim follows from the fact that (18) and (19) are positive.
•
This result shows that it is in the interest of the low-ability agents to
participate in the financing of education of the high-ability types if that is
the only way to encourage the educational investments of the high-ability
agents.8
4 The Time-Inconsistency andFree-Riding Prob-
lems in an Open Economy
In an open economy with global markets, factor mobility can be detriment al
to the feasibility of the social contract discovered above, especially if the cost
of migration is low for the educated but prohibitive for the uneducated. The
optimal behavior of the educated will be time inconsistent. The uneducated,
in turn, have an incentive to become free riders; their commitment to edu-
cational subsidy vanishes as they rationally anticipate the inflow of educated
individuals when domestic net return to human capital exceeds that abroad.
The resulting international tax optimum will be inefficient.9 Even worse, as
shovm below, the uneducated have a preference for zero contribution not only
from themselves but also from the educated, resulting in the risk of collapse
of the education system.
To develop the argument, we note that from the point of view of the
educated, their optimal choice as to the labor market will be determined by
their after-tax income. Once educated, they have both an option and an
incentive to re-optimize their location. Ex ante, they have an incentive to
accumulate human capital in the form of publicly financed education. Ex
8The bargaining outeome with demographie weights e = n/(l + n), 1 - e = 1/(1 + n)
would depend on the relative sizes of the dasses.
90ne ean interpret the tax system as an institution whieh ean be used to implement a
sodal eontract.
11post, however, they have an incentive to engage in tax avoidance. Those who
are uneducated willrationally antidpate such an incentive and in equilibrium,
we claim, there will be underinvestment in education, in that there cannot
be any sodal contract which would generate publicly financed education.
Let us denote the after-tax return to human capital in the world economy
by T. It is regarded as exogenous by every jurisdiction, and it dictates that
under free mobility, the domestic required rate ofreturn on the human capital
in jurisdiction, say i, has to satisfy the following condition:
T = (1 - tdaHf-l.
Imposing such a condition, the domestic human capital in migration equi-
librium can be solved as
Hj= [a(l; tlT~a
(20)
Clearly, Hj depends negativelyon the magnitude of the tax rate on educated
labor, oH;/ otl < O. High domestic tax thus leads to flight of the skilled
input.
That the uneducated will oppose any contract which levies a tax on the
incomes of the educated can be shown as folIows. From their perspective
and given that the net return to human capital is exogenous, the optimal
contract has to maximize the sum of their gross income and the tax revenue
from the educated, given by
11= (I _ a +atd [a(1 ; td] I~a
To study the determination of the optimal tax rate, evaluate first the
derivative
oll
otl a [_a(_I_-_tl_)] l~a _ (1- a + atl)_a l_ [a_(~I_-_tl~)] l~a T l-al-~ T
__ a tl_ ra(l- td] l~a 1 - a 1- tl T
12Now, it is clear that Bn/Btl > 0 when tl < 0, and Bn/Btl < 0 when
tl > O. Therefore, the optimal contribution of the educated must satisfy
t1 = O. This implies that in a global economy, the burden of public financing
ofeducation of the skilled is borne entirely, ifby anyone, by the unskilled. The
latter, however, cannot benefit from such investments, either. \Vepresent this
result as follows:
Proposition 3 Social contmct offinancing education between high- and low-
ability individuals breaks down when the educated become mobile and social
contmcts are restricted to be national.
Our result is analogous to that in Sinn (1997). He derives a result that
tax competition does not lead to inefficiently low provision of an interme-
diate public good used in production, but may cause adverse distributional
consequences. However, in the current case, the unskilled cannot benefit
from subsidizing education. The reason behind this difference is the follow-
ing. In Sinn (1997), the public good is infrastructure and is independent of
the mobile factor. In our model, public expenditures are used to finance an
intermediate good which is embodied in the mobile factor and is thus also
itself mobile.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that anational social contract to finance educa-
tion between mobile high-ability agents and immobile low-ability agents can
arise in a closed economy but does not survive harsh tax competition. The
possibility of migration combined with tax competition represents a destruc-
tive force leading to a Pareto-inferior outcome. We did not include efficiency
gains of migration. If the return to education is subject to region-specific
uncertainty, the possibility of migration may insure the educated against
region-specific risks. In the presence of migration costs, taxation may pre-
vent migration and thus lead to a loss of at least part of efficiency gains
attainable through migration. These ideas have been developed, for exam-
pIe, by Wildasin (1995). On the other hand, migration costs may create
a possibility to sustain a social contract even when the educated can mi-
grate. We suppose that the presence of migration would in any case lead to
a lower investment in education even if some kind of social contract could
be maintained. Lower investment in education means lost opportunities in
13production, but it also alleviates the time-inconsistency problem by lowering
gains from emigration to a country with lower taxation.
The tax system presented here was a result of Nash bargaining. This
idea of government is very optimistic. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue
that if governments are selfish Leviathans, tax competition may be a remedy
offered by a federal structure and should be favored rather than controlled.
We have focused on the idea of a government resting on the consent of the
governed and using tax revenues to the benefit of the citizens. If the low-
ability voters are in the majority, the fact that they participate in financing
higher education lends plausibility to our model. It should also be noted
that in addition to the low-ability individuals, the complementary factor
may include other fixed factors, for example immobile capital and natural
resources.
Our model suggests that in Europe, for example, the social contract of fi-
nancing higher education should perhaps be established at the Union level.lO
Although this still leaves to the educated the possibility to avoid their tax
share through migration, say, to the United States, it would make the Eu-
ropean Union approximate a closed economy. On the other hand, a central-
ized solution might impose inefficient harmonization. Restrictions to migra-
tion would both be opposite to the principles of free mobility and eliminate
any potential efficiency gains from migration that are not present in current
model. The challenge is to create a system that would combine the possi-
bility of free migration and tax-financed education without the problems of
tax competition. Poutvaara (1998) analyzes the case where the governments
maximize the expected utility of those to be educated, and only those to
be educated pay taxes. Under these conditions, a tax constitution where the
educated pay their taxes to the region which has financed their education en-
courages the formation of human capital, thus benefiting the complementary
uneducated labor. In our model, also the low-skilled participate in financing
education. Even if the educated would pay their taxes to the region where
they have obtained education, the uneducated would not receive compen-
sation for their subsidy. An additional mechanism is needed to solve the
fre~riding problem: the unskilled of the region receiving skilled immigrants
should compensate the subsidies for education to the unskilled of the region
with emigration of human capital.
10This idea has earlier been discussed by Sinn (1997). See also Bhagwati and Hamada
(1982) for a related discussion in a different context.
14Appendix. Deriving tax rates resulting from
Nash bargaining
The contribution by the high-ability types in the Nash bargaining is
() 1 1 ~ ()-1 ~
t1 = -- + 1+ -H-a()ne + -H-a()Y2 + --H-ay1. (Al) a a a a
Using
H-a = n-ah-a = n-ae-a(ß+-,) (A2)
and (13), the third term in (Al) can be written as ()(ß + ,). Using (10),
(13) and (A2), the fourth term in (Al) can be written as ()l;:;a(ß~..,)a(ß+-r)I'.
Using (9), (13) and (A2), the fifth term in (Al) can be written as -(1 -
())(~)a(ß+-')I'(1 - ß). Substituting these into (Al), one obtains
() ß ()
t1 = 1- - + (ß + ,)()+ (__ )a(ß+-')I'[_ - 1+ ß - ()ß]. a ß+, a
After rearrangement, one obtains (16) in the main text.
From (14), we obtain
ne - t1aHa n H-a a t2 = ---- = --e - t1--.
(1- a)Ha 1- a 1- a
Using first (A2) and then (13), one obtains (17) in the main text.
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